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Abstract: This paper examines socio-historical roots of 
Southeast Asia’s Islamist terrorism. Specifically focusing on 
cases of terrorism in Indonesia,   it deals with global, 
regional, and local factors that underline the emergence of 
“radical Islamism” as the roots of modern terrorism. 
Although there had been some connections between 
Southeast Asia’s militant Islamists to Afghanistan-based 
jihadists,  an emphasis on the Al-Qaeda-centric paradigm as 
a framework for analyzing the rise of the region’s terrorism 
is over-exaggerated. This analytical emphasis tends to 
ignore the international, regional and local agencies outside 
Al-Qaeda as well as local political dynamics and socio-
historical grounds that have contributed to the appearance 
of radical Islamism. Subscribing to Edward Said’s 
“travelling theory”, this paper argues that the idea of 
terrorism travels, not only from “person to person, from 
situation to situation, from one period to another” in a 
socio-historical vacuum, but also in response to specific 
historical and social changes. The idea of “radical 
Islamism” travels particularly from Afghanistan and 
elsewhere to Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia.  
Keywords: Islamist terrorism, radical Islamism, jiha>d. 
Introduction 
In the wake of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade 
Center of New York and the Pentagon of Washington, the US is 
taking a renewed interest in Southeast Asia’s ‘Second Front’ in the 
‘War on Terror’ project, declaring such organizations as Jama’ah 
Islamiyah (JI) and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) of the Philippines 
“foreign terrorist organizations” having links to Osama Bin Laden and 
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Afghanistan-based Al-Qaeda.1 In response to these terrorist attacks, 
the United States, under the Bush administration, proclaimed the 
global “war on terrorism,”2 and invited other countries to join this 
campaign against (Muslim) terrorists that, according to Bush and his 
allies, have threatened worldwide human’s security as well as 
international peace and stability. Specifically, the US government 
blamed Al-Qaeda-linked terrorist groups as the doers of the deadly 
attacks that resulted in some 3,000 casualties.  
The US furthermore listed a number of radical Muslim groups 
considered to be Foreign Terrorist Organizations, some of which 
included Al-Qaeda (Afghanistan), ASG (the Philippines), JI 
(Indonesia), Hamas (Palestine), Hezbollah (Lebanon), and Ikhwanul 
Muslimin (Egypt). Of these terrorist organizations, Al-Qaeda has been 
viewed as the most dangerous and widespread terrorist group 
operating in wide-reaching major countries including those of 
Southeast Asia.3 The United Nations, moreover, adopted Resolution 
1267 that made provision for the United Nations Monitoring Group 
to preserve a consolidated list of individuals and entities that were part 
                                                 
1 Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Boulder, Colo.: 
Lynne Rienner, 2003), pp. 38-40; Idem, “Tentacles of Terror: Al-Qaeda’s Southeast 
Asian Network,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, 3 (2002b). 
2 It is significant to note that there is no an agreed definition of what constitutes 
terrorism. The international community and body such as the United Nations (UN) or 
Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) have failed in its attempts to adopt a 
convention defining precisely what is meant by terrorism. Thayer distinguishes the 
term “old terrorism” from that of “new terrorism.” For him, the term “old terrorism” 
relates to selective political violence committed by anti-government insurgents and 
ethno-nationalist separatists, usually acting in isolation, and was confined in geographic 
scope’s essay. “New terrorism,” by contrast, refers to high-profile mass causality 
(apocalyptic) attacks against civilians by internationally networked terrorist groups. See 
Carlyle A. Thayer, “Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations in Southeast 
Asia” (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Center for Defense Leadership Studies, 2005); 
Damien Kingsbury (ed), Violence in Between: Conflict and Security in Archipelagic Southeast 
Asia (Clayton and Singapore: Monash Asia Institute and Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2005), p. 53. In addition to this characterization, there is also “state terrorism” 
which refers to violence and coercion committed or sponsored by a ruling government 
to weaken and destroy opposing and resisting forces of the regime which they 
perceived to be potential to threaten, delegitimize and destabilize their state. See Bruce 
Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), pp. 13-44.  
3 Angel Rabasa, Beyond Al-Qaeda: Countering Terrorist and other non-Traditional Threats 
(Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation, 2007); Idem, Political Islam in Southeast 
Asia: Moderates, Radicals, and Terrorist (Curzon: Routledge, 2003). 
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of, or associated with, Afghanistan’s Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Besides 
listing some 272 persons linked to Al-Qaeda, the United Nations, like 
the U.S., more specifically, has designated ASG and JI as Southeast 
Asia’s terrorist groups that have strong ties to Afghan jihadists.4  
Just as the United States and the United Nations, an international 
terrorism expert, Rohan Gunaratna,5 also asserts the central role played 
by Osama Bin Laden (hereafter Bin Laden) and Al-Qaeda in the 
spread of global terrorism. 6 He argues that Al-Qaeda is the “axis of 
global terrorism” including in Southeast Asia, and Bin Laden is 
portrayed as a chief executive officer (CEO) presiding over a global 
terrorist organization composed of Al-Qaeda members and leaders of 
Southeast Asian militant Islamic groups. Jane Corbin also points out 
that Al-Qaeda was run like a business conglomerate or multinational 
corporation under the directorship of Bin Laden, who served as CEO 
of the “terrorist company.” Corbin analogues Al-Qaeda to the Saudi 
Binladen’s construction company founded by the father of Bin Laden.7  
Examining Al-Qaeda-Centric Paradigm of Global Terrorism 
Although the above scholars’ analyses help to understand 
international dimensions of Southeast Asia’s terrorism, they fail to 
recognize, identify, and analyze regional and local aspects and political 
dynamics that led to violent acts of “Islamist terrorism.”8 As well, their 
                                                 
4 ICG (International Crisis Group), “Al-Qaida in Southeast Asia: the Case of the 
‘Ngruki Network’ in Indonesia,” Brussels: ICG Asia Briefing, 2002; idem., “Indonesia 
Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix.” Asia Report no. 83, 
September 15 2004.  
5 Rohan Gunaratna, “Al-Qaeda’s Ideology,” in Hillel Fradkin, Hussain Haqqani, and 
Eric Brown (eds), Current Trends in Islamist Ideology (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 
2005); Idem., Inside Al-Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (Columbia, NY: Columbia Univ. 
Press, 2002). 
6 Zachary Abuza, an expert on terrorism, claims that Al-Qaeda is composed of a 
central leadership of around thirty individuals, an international network of twenty-four 
constituent groups, eighty front companies operating in fifty countries, and a 
membership of between 5,000 and 12,000 organized into cells in sixty different 
countries. See Zachary Abuza, “Al-Qaeda’s Asian Web of Terror,” Time (Asia) 160, no. 
22 (2002): pp. 38-40.  
7 See Jane Corbin, Al Qaeda: In Search of the Terror Network That Shook the World (New 
York: Thunder Mouth Press/Nation Books, c2002), p. 33.  
8 The term “Islamist terrorism” in this piece refers to any violent act against civilians 
or governments committed by Islamist groups or radical jihadists, either those having 
links to transnational radical groups or purely local-based terrorists (cf. Abou El Fadl 
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judgment about Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda-centric global terrorism is  a 
kind of exaggeration and simplification, albeit there had been some 
linkages between Southeast Asian (Muslim) terrorists and Afghanistan-
based jihadist groups. Such an Al-Qaeda-centric paradigm, moreover, 
fails to comprehend the dynamics, complexities, and history of local 
politics within Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. It should be kept in 
mind that Al-Qaeda emerged as an international jihadist terrorist 
organization in its own right only after Bin Laden (born in 1957) 
returned to Afghanistan in May 1996. He came back to this country 
after spending a period of time in an exile in Sudan, accompanied by 
Ayma >n al-Zawa>hiri > (b. 1951, a well-known hardliner and the 
mastermind of the Egyptian Islamic Jiha >d, later becoming the Al-
Qaeda’s ideologue) and a large number of Arab Afghan jihadists.  
More specifically, Al-Qaeda was transformed into a global terrorist 
group since this organization was led by  al-Zawa >hiri > . Al-Zawa>hiri >  
filled the leadership of Al-Qaeda following the death of `Abdulla >h 
Azzam (1941-1989), the ideological father of Al-Qaeda, who was 
assassinated by the Egyptian members of Al-Qaeda in Peshawar, 
Pakistan. Under al-Zawa >hiri >’s leadership, the new ideology of Al-
Qaeda was marked by enthusiasm to carry out armed struggles against 
the perceived adversaries of Islam.9 This new ideology of Al-Qaeda’s 
                                                                                                      
2005). Unlike other forms of terrorism, Islamist terrorism has typically been 
characterized by ideologically-motivated actions, that is, to revive Islam from outside 
influences, to “clean up” the world from “earthly feces,” and finally to establish an 
Islamic state based on the Qur’an and Shari’a. The use of the term “Islamist 
terrorism,” instead of “Islamic terrorism,” suggests that this particular sort of terrorism 
has nothing to do with “Islamic religion,” but rather is linked to a certain group of 
Muslims known as radical Islamists or militant jihadists. See Mark Juergensmeyer, 
Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2003); Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold 
War, and the Roots of Terror (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004). The definition of 
Islamist terrorism I sketched above, thus, covers what Marc Sageman calls salafi 
jihadism which represents a radical fringe of global salafi movement. Sageman points 
out that salafi jihadism (global salafi jiha >d) is a new development in the history of 
terrorism in part because it combines fanaticism (excessive enthusiasm in religious 
belief) with the terrorism against both the “near enemy” (local secular governments or 
Muslims outside their groups) and the “far enemy” (foreign governments and their 
populations) in pursuit of the salafi objective of building an Islamic state (or caliphate). 
See Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia, PA: Univ. of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004). 
9 Gunaratna, “Al-Qaeda’s Ideology”; Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia.  
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jihadism, conventionally traced to the work of two militant Sunni 
thinkers: Muh }ammad b. `Abd al–Wahha >b (1703-1792, the founder of 
Wahhabism) and Sayyid Qut}b (1906-1966, an Egyptian ideologue who 
radicalized Ikhwanul Muslimin and is widely acknowledged as the 
father of militant jiha >d),10 has been echoed by the worldwide radical 
jihadist Islamist groups from the Middle East to Indonesia.   
It is important to note that Al-Qaedawas, initially, not a “terrorist 
group” utilizing suicide bombings to blow up “secular” buildings and 
target innocent civilians of non-Muslims of the western or eastern 
origins. Instead, this organization was, at first, set up to do jiha >d in the 
sense fighting against those who invaded Muslim territory or those 
who repressed Muslim communities. To put it differently, the origin of 
the establishment of Al-Qaeda was to conduct “defensive jiha>d.” 
When Azzam, a Jordanian member of the Palestinian Muslim 
Brotherhood and reportedly a founder of Hamas, formulated the 
founding charter of Al-Qaeda (perhaps early 1988, shortly before the 
Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan), he envisaged Al-Qaeda (literally 
“Al-Sulbah”—the “Solid Base”) as an organization that would channel 
the energies of the Afghan muja>hidi>n into fighting on behalf of 
worldwide oppressed Muslims.11 In short, the formation of Al-Qaeda 
was to serve as a “new vanguard group” for Islamic ummah. Azzam, 
one of the former Bin Laden’s teachers at King Abdulaziz University, 
envisioned a revolutionary Muslim vanguard (read, Al-Qaeda) in part 
because he envisaged that it would overturn un-Islamic regimes in the 
Arab and the Middle East and establish an Islamic rule.   
In April 1988, Azzam depicted his original concept of Al-Qaeda as 
follows:  
Every principle needs a vanguard to carry it forward and, 
while focusing its way into society, puts up with heavy tasks 
                                                 
10 Khaled Abou El Fadl, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists (New York, 
NY: HarperSanFrancisco, 2005); Ahmad S. Mousalli, Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The 
Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyid Qutb (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 
1992).   
11 Ahmad Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (Yale: 
Yale University Press, 2001); Ibid., Descent Into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of 
Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Viking Penguin, 
2008). 
 
  
Sumanto Al Qurtuby 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 04, Number 02, December 2010 
210 
and enormous sacrifices. There is no ideology, neither 
earthly nor heavenly, that does not require such a vanguard 
that gives everything it possesses in order to achieve victory 
for this ideology. It carries the flag all along the sheer, 
endless and difficult path until it reaches its destination in 
the reality of life, since Allah SWT has destined that it 
should make it and manifests itself. Al-Qaeda Al-Sulbah 
constitutes this vanguard for the expected society.12   
While the concept of Al-Qaeda was transformed to meet the 
changing geopolitical landscapes, Azzam did not originally intend it to 
be a global terrorist organization. He was reportedly to be a firm 
believer that “the end does not justify the means.” During the Afghan-
Soviet war, for instance, Azzam rejected a proposal by Egyptian 
members of Maktab al-Khidmah li al-Muja>hidi>n al-`Arab (MAK) 
which was widely known as the Afghan Service Bureau to utilize jiha>di > 
funds to train the muja >hidi>n in terrorist ways, strategies, and tactics. He 
even issued a fatwa stating that such terrorism is a violation of Islamic 
law. Believing in jiha >d as a religious obligation in defense of Islam and 
Muslims against defined enemies and not a speculative one, Azzam 
was against “the killing of non-combatants and would never endorse 
Al-Qaeda’s current spate of terrorist tactics”.13 Although Azzam was 
the ideological father of Al-Qaeda and former Bin Laden’s mentor 
since the Soviet invasion of 1979 and the creation of the MAK, later, 
Bin Laden gradually transformed leadership of the organization. 
Toward the end of the anti-Soviet-Afghan campaign, Bin Laden’s 
relationship with Azzam deteriorated. The peak of conflict between 
Azzam and Bin Laden, moreover, was when Azzam supported the 
“Lion of Panjshir” Ahmad Shah Massoud (1953-2001) while Bin 
Laden preferred Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (b. 1947), one of the most 
controversial of the muja>hidi >n leaders who once had been accused of 
spending more time fighting other muja>hidi>n than killing Soviets. 
Finally, the conflict between Azzam and Bin Laden had been resolved, 
not by democratic and peaceful means, but by the assassination of 
Azzam in 1989.14  
                                                 
12 As cited in Gunaratna, “Al-Qaeda’s Ideology,” p. 61. 
13 Gunaratna, Inside Al-Qaeda, p. 2. 
14 Gunaratna, “Al-Qaeda’s Ideology”; Rabasa, Beyond Al-Qaeda; Abuza, Militant Islam in 
Southeast Asia. 
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Thus, it is obvious that since al-Zawa>hiri > became the new 
ideologue of Al-Qaeda and the new mentor of Bin Laden following 
the murder of Azzam, Al-Qaeda has shifted to a new form of jihadism 
and has turned to become an agent of global terrorism. Both Bin 
Laden and al-Zawa >hiri > have the same passion: transforming Al-Qaeda 
into a global jihadist terrorist group to drive out secular regimes and 
western infidels alike in the name of Islam. In August 1996, Bin Laden 
issued a Declaration of Jiha >d whose goals were “to drive U.S. forces 
out of the Arabian peninsula, overthrow the Saudi government, and 
liberate Islam’s holy cities of Mecca and Medina, as well as support 
revolutionary groups around the world.”15 The declaration states: “The 
walls of oppression and humiliation cannot be demolished except in a 
rain of bullets.”.16 Since the declaration Al-Qaeda shifted its focus and 
meaning of jiha>d from the “near enemy” and defensive jiha>d to the 
“far enemy” and offensive one: war against the Americans and their 
‘infidel’ allies. In 2000, Bin Laden announced the shape of the World 
Islamic Front for the Jiha >d against Jews and Crusaders, un umbrella 
group of Islamist radical movements across the world, and issued a 
fatwa obligating all Muslims to kill Americans and their allies that 
formed what he called a Judeo-Christian conspiracy.17 At the same 
year, interestingly, JI created Ra>bit}at al-Muja>hidi>n (Legion of 
Muja>hidi>n), an umbrella organization of Southeast Asian Islamist 
groups engaged in armed struggle.18  
It is significant to note that Southeast Asian Muslim militants, 
particularly those associated with JI and ASG, first journeyed to 
northern Pakistan and Afghanistan in 1980s,19 just a year after the 
                                                 
15 John L. Esposito, Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), pp. 20-1. 
16 As quoted in Rashid, Taliban, p.133,   
17 Esposito, Unholy War, p. 21. 
18 The members of the Legion of Muja>hidi>n included MILF, Free Aceh Movement 
(known as GAM—Gerakan Aceh Merdeka), Rohingiya Solidarity Organization, Araken 
Rohingiya Nationalist Organization, and Jemmah Salafiya (Thailand).  
19 Greg Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle: Jamaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam (Sidney: 
University of New South Wales Press, 2004); Thayer, “Leadership Dynamics in 
Terrorist Organizations”; ICG (International Crisis Group), “The Philippines: 
Counter-Insurgency versus Counter-Terrorism in Mindanao,” Asia Report No. 152, 
May 14 2008. 
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Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, a country that has been called a 
“highway of conquest”.20 This means that the contact between 
Southeast Asian radical Islamists with Afghan jihadists was at least 
eight years before Al-Qaeda was founded (in 1988) and eighteen years 
prior to the launching by Bin Laden of his global jiha >d against the far 
away foes of the “Western infidels.” The Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan at the end of 1979 in part because it had distrusted the 
leadership of radical Khalqis that dominated PDPA (the Peoples 
Democratic Party of Afghanistan) government since it took power in a 
bloody coup de tat in 1978 that caused the murder of Mohammed Daud 
Khan.  
As Barfield has noticed, the militant Khalqis controlled the PDPA 
rule were not just interested in governing Afghanistan but in 
“transforming the country through revolutionary policies of land 
reform, education, and changes in family law.” In an attempt to 
impose their radical policies, moreover, the Khalqis attacked and 
wiped out all who opposed them, including “their Parchami rivals, the 
traditional rural landowners, the old military establishment, and Islamic 
clergy.” More significantly, the Khalqis refused Afghanistan’s 
traditional Islamic symbols of authority and legitimacy by “striking 
religious salutations from their speeches and decrees and changing the 
color of the flag to red.” As a result, when the regime tried to 
implement its peculiar and radical policies in the countryside they were 
met with fight and resistance that quickly turned the country to 
massive uprisings that led to out of control. In this critical moment, 
driven by the desire to restore stability and bring the communist 
government back in, the Soviets intervened by occupying the country. 
They quickly removed and replaced the Khalqi with Parchami 
leadership under Babrak Karmal, and then were involved in an 
extensive war against the Afghan fighters as an effort to impose the 
new regime into submission and to drive them out the country.21  
It was during this early period of the Soviet-Afghan war that 
Southeast Asian radical Islamists forged personal ties with leading 
figures in the muja>hidi>n of Afghanistan. One particular influential 
figure was Abdul Rasul Sayyaf (b. 1946), a Pasthun warlord and leader 
                                                 
20 Thomas Barfield, “Problems in Establishing Legitimacy in Afghanistan,” Iranian 
Studies 37, 2 (2004): p. 263. 
21 Ibid., pp. 280-2. 
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of Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (founded in late 
1970s, later renamed the Islamic Dakwah Organization of 
Afghanistan), a radical salafi party supported by Saudi Wahha >bi > 
funding. It was under Sayyaf’s patronage that key leaders of JI and 
ASG were trained at his camp in Afghanistan. Sayyaf provided training 
facilities to the bulk of Southeast Asia’s Muslim militants while Bin 
Laden was in exile in Sudan (1991-1996). It was Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, 
member of the Afghan-based Ikhwanul Muslimin founded by 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (b. 1947, the founder of Hezb-e-Islami) and 
Burhanuddin Rabbani (b. 1940, the leader of Jamiat-e-Islami 
Afghanistan) (cf. Ewans 2002), who inspired the foundation of Abu 
Sayyaf Group (ASG) in the southern Philippines. The name of Abu 
Sayyaf (lit., the “father of the sword”) was derived from the kunya 
(honorific name in place of given name) adopted by Abdurajak 
Janjalani, one of the founders of ASG, when he named his oldest son 
Sayyaf, thereby becoming Abu Sayyaf or the “father of Sayyaf.” 
Abdurrajak Janjalani (d. 1998) named his son after he met Abdul Rasul 
Sayyaf, who ran the training camp he attended in Afghanistan.22 In 
1990, Janjalani also met Bin Laden’s brother-in-law Muh}ammad Jama>l 
Khali >fa, then heading the Philippines office of the International of 
Islamic Relief Organization23 (IIRO). Khalifa began directing funds his 
way and eventually drew him into an Al-Qaeda cell in the Philippines 
that included Ramzi Yousef, the 1993 WTC bomber, and Yousef’s 
uncle, 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammad.  
Established in the mid-1980s by a number of Afghan war veterans 
and members of Moro National Liberation Front (henceforth MNLF, 
founded in 1971 by Nur Misuari), ASG was originally known as the 
Muja>hidi>n Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF) or al-H{arakah al-
Islami >yah (the “Islamic Movement). In 1991, MCFF was renamed Abu 
                                                 
22 Kit Collier, “Dynamics of Muslim Separatism in the Philippines,” in Damien 
Kingsbury (ed.), Violence in Between: Conflict and Security in Archipelagic Southeast Asia 
(Clayton and Singapore: Monash Asia Institute and Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2005); ICG (International Crisis Group), “The Philippines.” 
23 IIRO was the most famous nongovernmental organization that channeled funds 
from two banks: Dar al- Mal al-Islami (founded by Prince Mohammed Faisal in 1981) 
and Dalla al-Baraka (established by King Fahd’s brother-in-law in 1982) to assist 
fighting and relief services during the Afghan-Soviet war. IRRO functioned under the 
umbrella of the World Islamic League, led by Wahabi radical cleric Mufti Abdul Aziz 
bin Baz.  
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Sayyaf Group (or Jama’ah Abu Sayyaf). The establishment of ASG was 
partly because Janjalani, a charismatic preacher in the mosques and 
madrasas of Zamboanga and Basilan of the Philippines, opposed the 
ideas of peace talks posed by Nur Misuari of MNLF.24 Janjalani 
insisted that the sole objective of the Muslim struggle was the 
establishment of an Islamic state, and not autonomy, independence, or 
revolution as MNLF did. Has been the principal target of the U.S. 
government, ASG, however, in reality is not political motivated 
insurgency or religious-driven rebellion in the same sense as the 
MNLF or Moro Islamic Liberation Front (hereafter MILF, founded in 
1977).25   
Based in and around the southern islands of the Philippines, 
particularly in the region of Bangsamoro (Jolo, Basilan, and Mindanao), 
ASG is best understood as a “network of networks,” an alliance of 
smaller groups around individual charismatic leaders who “compete 
and cooperate to maximize their reputation for violence and terrorism: 
the bigger the violence, the bigger the pay-off, in terms of higher 
ransom payments and foreign funding”.26 Contrary to some 
assumptions, the ASG was not an Islamist uprising that “degenerated” 
into criminality following the death of its founder, Aburajak Janjalani, 
in 1998. After the death of Janjalani, ASG was headed by his younger 
brother, Khaddafy Janjalani (d. 2006). Under the leadership of 
Khaddafy, ASG was marked by kidnapping, murders, and robberies as 
part of its modus operadi to get funds. Its religio-political activities and 
terrorism, however, did not die following Janjalani’s death.  
Another leading figure of the southern Philippines’ jihadists by the 
name of Hashim Salamat, the founder of MILF also encountered 
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf when they studied in Al-Azhar University of 
Egypt. Died in 2003, Salamat also joined the Afghan muja>hidi>n during 
                                                 
24 MNLF, led by Nur Misuari, is the largest grouping of armed separatists fighting 
against the government of the Philippines. Under the auspices of the Organization of 
Islamic Conference and Muammar Qaddafi of Libya, the Marcos rule held negotiations 
with the MNLF reaching a treaty known as the “Tripoli Agreement” in 1976. The pact 
contains, among other, an agreement in which each group would stop fighting and the 
southern Philippines would be granted as an autonomous Muslim region. 
Unfortunately, the Marcos regime never honored the accord. See Kingsbury (ed.), 
Violence in Between, pp. 44-5.  
25 Ibid. 
26 ICG (International Crisis Group), “The Philippines,” p. 7. 
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a ten-year jiha >d to expel the Soviet Union.27 The MILF is a fragment of 
the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF, founded in 1971 by Nur 
Misuari), the oldest separatist group in the region. The foundation of 
the MILF was due to a leadership dispute and ideological differences 
of its founder (Hashim Salamat) with Nur Misuari of MNLF. Having 
contacts with a number of international jihadist groups, including JI, 
MILF is a political movement with the banner of an Islamist 
ideology.28  
Like the Philippines’s leaders and activists of MILF and ASG, JI’s 
members in Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia were ex-combatants of 
the Afghan wars and alumni of Pakistan’s Deobandi madrasas. They 
also claim of having contacts with Afghan jihadist leaders. In 
December 2001, about three months after the 9/11 attacks, Singapore 
                                                 
27 See Thayer, “Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations.” One of the most 
leading figures after the death of Hashim Salamat (d. 2003) is Mugasid Delma alias 
Abu Badrin, a classmate of Umar Petek, another terrorist associated with JI, in 
Afghanistan. Both were in the same intake at the JI military academy in Sada, Pakistan, 
on the Afghan border, in 1991. Other members of that class were the bombers of the 
2002 Bali Blasts: Imam Samudra, Ali Imron alias Mukhlas (both, along with Amrozi, 
had been shot by a firing squad in October 2008), Sarjiyo alias Sawad, as well as Aris 
Munandar, leader of KOMPAK, an aid agency which reportedly funded by Muslim 
Aid in Britain. After the academy was forced to disband in 1992, Mugasid moved to 
Afghanistan’s Torkhman with a group of JI members including Petek, Abu Dujana, 
and Zarkasih, the JI leaders arrested in June 2007. When Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi 
(born in Madiun, East Java), one of JI’s most senior operatives, was shot dead at a 
checkpoint outside Cotabato city in October 2003, Mugasid reportedly was riding the 
lead motorcycle in his convoy. This explanation suggests that there had been some 
links between Indonesia-based JI and the Philippines-based terrorist groups such as 
MILF and ASG. Such close link can be understood since most of the members of 
those terrorist groups were the Soviet-Afghan war veterans, alumni of Afghanistan’s 
paramilitary camps, and graduates of Pakistan’s Deobandi madrasas. JI also built a 
military academy known as Camp Hudaibiyah, a camp for foreign fighters located 
within Camp Abu Bakar, in the southern Philippines in 1994, to replace its 
Afghanistan facilities and bases. In 1998, the camp became the headquarters of JI’s 
territorial sub-division in the region so-called Mantiqi III which its territory covered 
Indonesia’s Sulawesi and East Kalimantan as well as Malaysia’s Sabah. See ICG 
(International Crisis Group), “The Philippines.” When Camp Abu Bakar was overrun 
by the Philippines’ authorities in the summer of 2000, JI members moved its training 
and bases in Central Sulawesi’s Poso, one of the frailest places in Indonesia suffered by 
Christian-Muslim wars. See Lorraine V. Aragon, “Communal Violence in Poso, 
Central Sulawesi: Where People Eat Fish and Fish Eat People,” Indonesia 72 (2001): pp. 
45-79. 
28 Rashid, Taliban, p. 128. 
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authorities arrested fifteen Muslim militants suspected of working with 
Al-Qaeda who planned to bomb a shuttle bus service carrying U.S. 
military personnel and U.S. naval vessels in Singapore. Later, a 
videotape found in Afghanistan confirmed the “Singapore 
connection.” Thirteen of the Singapore detainees, eight of which 
reportedly had training in Afghanistan’s Al-Qaeda camps, were said to 
be members of a cell of an organization that authorities identified as JI. 
In a speech in May 2002, Lee Kuan Yew states:  
Interrogation [of the suspects detained in Singapore] 
disclosed that Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, the [former] leader of 
the Indonesian Muja>hidi>n Council in Indonesia, was the 
overall leader of the JI organization, which covered both 
Malaysia and Singapore. He was a member of Darul Islam, 
which aimed at the violent establishment of an Islamic state 
in Indonesia since the late 1940s. He was in Malaysia for 14 
years to avoid detention by the Suharto government and 
returned in 1999 after Suharto fell from power.29 
Since Singapore authorities arrested alleged JI members, 
particularly since Senior Minister Lee delivered that speech, attention 
shifted to Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (b. 1938), an Indonesian Islamist cleric 
of Yamani origin who was considered to be the new Ami >r alMu’mini >n 
(the “Leader of Believers”) of JI. Since the death of Abdullah Sungkar 
(1937-1999), a charismatic leader of JI, Ba’asyir has become a “new 
celebrity” due to his central position as leader of both JI (he succeeded 
Sungkar after his death in 1999) and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia 
(MMI).30 Established by Indonesian radical cleric of (H{ad }rami >) Yamani 
origin by the name of Abdullah Sungkar in the early 1990s, JI was 
regarded by the United States and the United Nations as a regional 
terrorist network closely linked to Al-Qaeda. JI was also considered as 
the closest nexus between radical Islamism in Southeast Asia and the 
global jihadist movement.  
Working on Indonesian politics and societies for decades, the 
Australian sociologist Greg Barton, however, underscores the 
dynamics of Indonesia’s local politics as the roots of the formation of 
                                                 
29 ICG (International Crisis Group), “Al-Qaida in Southeast Asia.” 
30 The MMI is now split due to internal conflict between Ba’asyir and Irfan Awwas in 
terms of the groups’ ideology. Finally, Ba’asyir established a new organization named 
Jama’ah Anshorussunah. 
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JI. Specifically, Barton31 traces back the origins of JI to three 
Indonesia’s Islamist and separatist groups: (1) Hizbullah (the “Party of 
God”), a militia set up during World War II to oppose the Dutch and 
then the Japanese (1942-1945); (2) Darul Islam (DI—the “Adobe of 
Islam”), a sort of re-embodiment of Hizbullah whose main objective 
was to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia known as Negara Islam 
Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic State); and (3) Komando Jihad (KJ—the 
“Jiha>d Command”), Islamist guerrillas and reincarnation of DI during 
the reign of Suharto-led New Order. Court documents from the 1980s 
also show that KJ referred to the founding of an organization, 
continuing from Darul Islam, as JI. After Sukarno cracked down the 
headquarters of DI in 1962, its members later were found to be 
dubbed by the New Order as KJ in 1976-77. In order to discredit the 
Islamists linked with PPP (the only Islamic party during the New 
Order) prior to the 1977 elections, the Suharto regime arrested 185 
people associated with what the New Order called KJ group in mid-
1977. It was Gen. Ali Murtopo (1924-1984, the “Suharto man”), along 
with his officers within Indonesian intelligence agency (known at the 
time as BAKIN), who engaged in a “smart operation” that made the 
KJ activists (which were DI members) out of their hiding. At the time, 
Ali Mortopo said (persuaded exactly) to a handful of DI leaders that he 
needed members and activists of DI to blockade the influences of 
Communism in Indonesia.32  
                                                 
31 Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle.  
32 The argument provided by Gen. Ali Murtopo-led intelligence agency was that, with 
the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, Indonesia was in danger of Communist infiltration 
across the Indonesian-Malaysian border in Borneo, and that only the reactivation of 
DI could protect Indonesia. Whether through coercion or bribe money (or both), a 
number of DI leaders rose to the bait, and by mid-1977, the government arrested 185 
people whom it accused of belonging to a hitherto unknown organization called 
Komando Jihad (KJ), committed to following the ideals of Kartosoewirjo and 
establishing the Islamic State of Indonesia. In reality, the KJ was Ali Murtopo’s 
creation. From the beginning, KJ or what the government called JI intersected, albeit it 
was unclear whether the government was attributing more structure to the latter than 
was in fact the case. KJ was the labeled applied by the government and the Indonesian 
media to the former DI fighters who never used it themselves. The term “JI” appears 
in court documents from the 1980s to refer to the new organization that the DI men 
thought they were setting up. See Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle; ICG (International Crisis 
Group), “Al-Qaida in Southeast Asia.”  
  
Sumanto Al Qurtuby 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 04, Number 02, December 2010 
218 
Approaching DI veterans to fight against Communists is apt in 
part because they played a strong role in the assault against 
communism since the mid-1960s. DI members, along with other 
Islamic organizations, enthusiastically backed the CIA-orchestrated 
coup (1965-66) that installed the Suharto dictatorship and resulted in 
massacre of some 500,000 (other said between 1-2 million casualties) 
Communist Party members, workers, and sympathizers.33 The Suharto 
group portrayed the coup as, to borrow Hefner’s words, an “irreligious 
communist plot against the nation”34 in order to gain popular-religious 
support. Suharto, then, mobilized the country’s Muslim groups, added 
by smaller groupings of Christians into an efficient campaign of mass 
killing. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in late 1979s, DI 
also sent some 350 fighters to join Afghan muja >hidi>n. Gaos Taufiq, 
Sumatra-based DI leader, revealed that Abdullah Azzam in a sermon in 
Mecca in the early 1980s invited worldwide Muslim jihadists to come 
to Afghanistan to do jiha>d against the communist regime and the 
Soviet Union. A number of Indonesian jihadists who heard Azzam’s 
sermon promised him that they would get more recruits in Indonesia, 
especially from DI and the Indonesian Muslim Youth Movement 
(known as GPII—Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia), a Wahabi-
affiliated Muslim youth organization. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, DI 
members came into contact with Abdullah Azzam, who was the key of 
founding present-day International Legion of Islam, an umbrella 
organization of worldwide jihadist movements.35 Hence, it is 
impossible to have a broad picture of all modern-day Indonesia’s 
jihadist movements without looking at the dynamics and complicated 
development of DI. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir draws inspiration from the DI 
rebellion in West Java in the 1950s and indeed he fully endorsed DI’s 
political agenda, albeit he was not the member of DI. However, 
Abdullah Sungkar, the first amir of JI, was a former officer of 
Kartosoewirjo’s Tentara Islam Indonesia (the “Islamic Army of 
                                                 
33 Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad (eds), Roots of Violence in Indonesia (Leiden: 
KITLV Press, 2002). 
34 Robert W. Hefner, “Muslim Democrats and Islamist Violence in Post-Soeharto 
Indonesia,” in Robert W Hefner (ed.), Remaking Muslim Politics: Pluralism, Contestation, 
and Democratization (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 277. 
35 Noor Huda Ismail, “Al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asia, Jamaah Islamiyah and Regional 
Terrorism: Kinship and Family Likns,” Japan Focus, January 8, 2007: pp. 3-10.  
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Indonesia”), the military wing of DI (note: Kartosoewirjo’s movement 
often called DI/TII). 
As the New Order crashed Komando Jihad, its activists were 
jailed, murdered, or fled to other places/countries. Abdullah Sungkar 
and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir were among those detained by the 
government. Due to their meetings with Haji Ismail Pranoto (Hispran 
for short), a close friend of, and had been a commander under 
Kartosoewirjo and was accused of leading the KJ movement, they 
were both charged with having been inducted into DI by Hispran. 
Whether Ba’asyir and Sungkar were directly associated with KJ or not, 
both men were known for making statements urging disobedience to 
secular authorities and questioning the validity of the (secular) 
Indonesian constitution. In particular Ba’asyir and Sungkar rejected the 
state ideology of Pancasila and criticized Suharto’s New Order. As a 
result, the government sentenced them to nine years in prison for 
subversion. They had been in detention since November 1978. When 
in late 1982, their sentences were reduced on appeal to three years and 
ten months, both men were released and then they returned to 
Pesantren Al-Mukmin, based in Ngruki, Central Java’s Solo (hence 
known as Pondok Ngruki), an Islamic boarding school they founded in 
1971 which later has become the primary networks and home-base of 
JI-related activities.36  
Facing forthcoming re-arrest, Ba’asyir and Sungkar fled to Malaysia 
in April 1985, accompanied by a number of the “Ngruki Network,” 
among them are Fikiruddin, Agus Sunarto, Rusli Aryus, Mubin 
Bustami, Fajar Sidiq, Muzahar Muhtar, and Agung Riyadi (later they 
were sent by Sungkar and Ba’asyir to join the Afghan war). In their 
views, they left for Malaysia is not to avoid (re) arrestment, but rather 
to do a religiously-inspired hijrah (emigration) to escape from the 
enemies of Islam, similar to the Prophet Muh}ammad’s hijrah from 
Mecca to Medina in early seventh century.37 In Malaysia they met an 
Indonesian Afghan war veteran known as Abu Jibril38 (alias Fikiruddin 
                                                 
36 Kumar Ramakrishna, “Delegitimizing Global Jihadi Ideology in Southeast Asia,” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 27, 3 (2005): pp. 343-69. 
37 Angel Rabasa, Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radicals, and Terrorist (Curzon: 
Routledge, 2003); Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia. 
38 Born in Indonesia’s East Lombok, Abu Jibril became well-known preacher at the 
Sudirman Mosque in Yogyakarta in early 1980s. He was captured by Malaysian 
authorities in 2002. Abu Jibril, a member of Indonesian Muja>hidi>n Council, also 
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Muqti or Muhammad Iqbal), with whom they established the 
Pesantren Luqmanul Hakiem, a clone of the Pondok Ngruki, in Ulu 
Tiram, Malaysia’s Johor state, as a base for indoctrination and 
operations. In addition Ba’asyir and Sungkar met Abdul Wahid 
Kadungga, the son-in-law of Kahar Muzakkar, Sulawesi-based DI. Part 
of the DI network, Kadungga fled to Europe in 1971 and later 
founded the Muslim Youth Association of Europe.  
Furthermore, Ba’asyir and Sungkar linked up with another 
Indonesian veteran of the Afghan war Riduan Isamuddin alias 
Hambali, who was reported to be the operational chief and conduit for 
funds from Al-Qaeda to JI (Hambali is Indonesian spelling of the 
Arabic word ‘Hanbali,’ which refers to the most dogmatic and 
traditionalist of the four Sunni school of law built based on the 
teachings of the legal scholar Ah}mad bin H{anbal, 780-855). It is said 
that Hambali, the only non-Arab member of the shu>ra > (central council) 
of Al-Qaeda, provided a critical link between the Indonesian Islamist 
militants of the Ngruki network and Bin Laden as well as Al-Qaeda.39 
Through his contact with Sungkar, in 1986, Hambali was invited to go 
to Afghanistan both for training and helping muja>hidi>n fighting against 
the Soviet Union. While Hambali spent the next two months in 
                                                                                                      
appears on a tape recruiting volunteers to fight in Maluku during the Muslim-Christian 
wars.   
39 Hambali played a central role in a number of terrorist bombings and violent acts in 
Indonesia and the Philippines. Since he held both Al-Qaeda and JI appointments, he 
also became a major link between the two terrorist organizations. Hambali’s role was 
not only to channel both groups but also to funnel some funds from Al-Qaeda to JI. 
From 1998-2001, Hambali funneled some US$12,000 to the MILF and some 
US$18,000 to Muslim fighters in Indonesia’s Ambon. He also provided Al-Qaeda 
funds to bomb specified targets in Southeast Asia including the Bali Blasts of 2002. 
Because of ongoing investigations in Indonesia and Malaysia, Hambali and his wife left 
Malaysia and travelled to Afghanistan via Bangkok (Hambali used his true name of 
Malaysian passport). After arriving in Karachi, they proceeded to Kandahar where they 
stayed for one month. While in Afghanistan, Hambali’s primary contacts included 
Mohammed Atef, the military commander of Al-Qaeda (killed in November 2001) and 
Khalid Syeikh Mohammed. To assist Al-Qaeda’s Anthrax program, Hambali recruited 
Yazid Sufaat, a U.S.-trained biochemist and a former Army Captain from Malaysia, 
who came to Afghanistan in June 2001. Yazid participated in a one-month training 
course and then began working with Hambali supporting the Anthrax program in 
Kandahar. Hambali was arrested by the Thai Special Branch upon his return to 
Malaysia and Indonesia. See ICG (International Crisis Group), “Al-Qaida in Southeast 
Asia”; idem., “The Philippines.”  
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Karachi, he met a number of individuals from Indonesia including 
Zulkarnaen who also became close to Al-Qaeda. Prior to his death, 
Abdullah Sungkar resent Hambali to Afghanistan to meet with Khalid 
Sheikh Mohammed, the mastermind of the 9/11 operation, and several 
important Al-Qaeda members including Wali Amin Khan Shah, who 
worked with Ramzi Ahmed Yousef to destroy 12 U.S. airliners over 
the Pacific (the attack was thwarted). The purpose of the meeting was 
to strengthen the already established ties with Al-Qaeda and arrange 
for JI members to travel to Afghanistan to receive training. In addition 
to several journeys to Afghanistan, Hambali reportedly made two trips 
to Pakistan in 1999 (first journey was alone while his second trip was 
accompanied by Faiz Bafana, a JI member of Singapore origin).40 
Hambali also reportedly travelled several times to Southern Philippines 
since early 1990s. There he met Syamsuddin, an Indonesian who 
subsequently brought him to the MILF Camp Abu Bakar, where he 
met MILF leader Hashim Salamat.  
In addition to support the establishment of an Islamic state in 
Indonesia, Sungkar and Ba’asyir identified a number of sympathetic 
Malaysian businessmen and travelled to Saudi Arabia for fund raising. 
Additionally, they established contacts and relationships with the 
muja>hidi>n leaders in Afghanistan during the Soviet-Afghan war. This 
encounter opened the gateway for JI members to become even more 
politicized and radicalized. In Afghanistan, they also received military 
training and were exposed to the ideology of armed jiha>d. Sungkar and 
Ba’asyir, with Saudi funding, furthermore, sent volunteers recruited 
mostly from Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia to Afghanistan, 
southern Philippines, southern Thailand for guerilla training, and 
Pakistan for “religious indoctrination” of Islamism and jihadism. It was 
in the camps of the Saudi-financed Afghan Muja >hidi>n leader Abdul 
Rasul Sayyaf that the senior members of then JI developed jihadist 
passion, global contacts, and deadly skills.41 It is reported that Andi 
Muhammad Taqwa and Abdullah Anshari (also known as Ibnu 
                                                 
40 Rabasa, Beyond Al-Qaeda; Zachary Abuza, “Tentacles of Terror: Al-Qaeda’s 
Southeast Asian Network,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 24, 3 (2002); idem., Militant 
Islam in Southeast Asia.. 
41 Gunaratna, “Al-Qaeda’s Ideology”; ICG (International Crisis Group), “Jamaah 
Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” Asia Report No. 63 
(Jakarta and Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2003). 
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Thoyib) were in charge to recruit the volunteers (they themselves 
travelled to Pakistan and Afghanistan to join the Afghanistan’s 
muja>hidi>n). The connection between the leaders of JI and Al-Qaeda 
does not cease by the end of the Afghan war. They reportedly visited 
one another. In the mid 1990s, Ayman al-Zawahiri of Al-Qaeda, for 
instance, visited and spent time engaging the JI leadership in Malaysia. 
In the second half of the 1990s, Sungkar and Ba’asyir visited Pakistan, 
where they met Bin Laden occasionally.42  
JI itself was established by Sungkar in 1993 after a dispute between 
him and the Indonesian-based DI leader Ajengan Masduki. However, 
the name of JI was “officially” used in 1995. Sungkar looked to make a 
clean break from DI by adopting a different organizational framework 
and structure of JI. Initially JI was set up as a clandestine group whose 
long-term objective was to establish a transnational Islamic state 
(Daulah Islamiyyah) comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, and the southern 
Philippines.43 Members of his small but militant group included 
Hambali, Abdul Ghani, Jamsari, Suhauime, Matsah, Adnan, and Faiz 
Bafana (all the Afghan war veterans). In Malaysia, JI is known as 
Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (KMM—Malaysian Militant Community), 
formed by Hambali, Abu Jibril, and Zainon Ismail (another Afghan 
war veteran) around 1994-95. They focused their efforts on Indonesian 
migrants, students, and lecturers at Universiti Teknologi Malaysia 
(UTM) and other local Islamic schools. As Sungkar and Ba’asyir who 
sent volunteers to Pakistan or Afghanistan, they also sent young 
Islamist militants from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to Pakistan 
(particularly Deobandi-affiliated schools) for religious indoctrination 
and the MILF camps (especially Camp Hudaibiyah) in Mindanao for 
military training (note: since the Soviet-Afghan war ended, JI built a 
military base in the region of Mindanao of southern Philippines).  
In order to preserve Islamist movements, the group was tied by 
ideology, training, and a complex network of marriages among their 
families. Such inter-marriage has facilitated JI to have a depth of 
leadership that provided a capacity for regeneration44  as well as a 
                                                 
42 John Sidel, Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 2006). 
43 Rabasa, Political Islam in Southeast Asia, p. 31. 
44 In his study on kinship and family links of Southeast Asia-based terrorist groups, 
Noor Huda Ismail discovers interesting findings of common inter-marriage among the 
members of jihadist groups. Abdullah Sungkar, for instance, married two of his 
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means of maintaining their “identity” and continuation of their groups. 
Joining the jiha>d was a three-pronged process of social affiliation 
(social bonding) involving membership in “small-world” groups based 
on friendship, kinship, and discipleship. The British social 
anthropologist Abner Cohen  once said that groups in modern 
societies utilized symbols link to kinship, friendship, and ritual to 
further and maintain their economic and political interests.45 Using 
Cohen’s theoretical frameworks, JI (and other terrorist organizations) 
can be included as “interest groups” that preserve and develop its 
communities and mission through a complex mixture of kinship, 
comradeship, relationship, discipleship, religious ritual, association, 
education, informal mechanism and so forth in order to safeguard not 
only political and economic interests but also ideological concerns.  
Despites inter-marriage, sending children and families to Pakistan-
based Deobandi madrasas became “habitual actions” of senior JI 
members. The rationale for sending their children and relatives to 
those places is partly because they were worried about their offspring’s 
safety and persistence, besides to rejuvenate JI. Deobandi madrasas 
became favorite destination for religious training and indoctrination of 
Southeast Asian jihadists mainly because these schools have been the 
hub of the dissemination of religious militancy and radical Islamism. 
Founded in 1867 in the North Indian town of Deoband by Maulana 
Qasim Nanotvi, the Deobandi began in the Indian subcontinent as a 
reformist movement. The Deobandi gained considerable strength 
during the anti-Soviet Afghan jiha >d in part because Gen. Zia al-Haq 
encouraged the establishment of madrasas for Afghan refugees as well 
as Pakistanis. With Saudi funding, particularly since the 1970s, the 
Deobandi madrasas have been the training ground for Al-Qaeda and 
radical Islamists and the vehicle of the spread of strict Wahabi 
                                                                                                      
stepdaughters to senior jihadists; they are Ferial Muchlis bin Abdul Halim, a head of 
the Selangor JI cell, and Syawal Yasin, a prominent South Sulawesi figure and former 
trainer in Afghanistan. Sungkar himself had been the celebrant at the 1984 marriage of 
future Mantiqi 4 leader (Mantiqi refers to the “regional division” of JI) Abdul Rohim 
Ayub and the Australian Rabiyah. Harris Fadhilah, one of DI militia leaders who died 
during the Ambon wars of 1999-2001, arranged the marriage of his daughter, Mira 
Agustina, to Indonesia-based Al-Qaeda operative Omar Al-Faruq. See Ismail, “Al-
Qaeda’s Southeast Asia,” pp. 1-11.  
45 Abner Cohen, Two-Dimensional Man: An Essay on the Anthropology of Power and 
Symbolism in Complex Society (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1974). 
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teachings. The Deobandi’s political expression and ideology, 
furthermore, were transformed within Pakistan’s Jamiyyat-i-Ulama-i-
Islam, a religious party headed by Maulana Fazlur Rahman with a rigid, 
militant, anti-American, and anti-non-Muslim culture.46  
In those madrasas, Southeast Asian jihadists formed so-called al-
Ghuraba (the “foreigners”) cell whose leader was Ba’asyir’s son: Abdul 
Rohim. During university break, some members of the group went to 
Afghanistan for a course in urban warfare. They also travelled to 
Pakistan-controlled parts of Kashmir where Lashkar-e-Toiba, a guerilla 
movement affiliated with Al-Qaeda, gave them a month of physical 
and military training. One of the group’s members was Abu Dzar 
whose father was a long-time colleague of Hambali. Two of Abu 
Dzar’s uncles are also JI members in which one of them, Muhammad 
Isma’il Anwarul, also attended an Al-Qaeda training camp in Kandahar 
in 2001. Abu Dzar’s sister had married to Masran bin Arshad, the 
leader of Khalid Syeikh Muhammd’s allaged suicide cell. Another cell 
member was the Malaysian Muhammad Ikhwan, whose father, 
Abdullah Daud, attended an Al-Qaeda surveillance course in Kabul in 
2000.47  
As is well-known, the Muja>hidi>n’s victory over the Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan after 10 year wars was a watershed event for radical Islam. 
The Afghan jiha>d undoubtedly increased JI’s military capabilities, their 
access to financial and other resource networks, and perhaps more 
importantly, their sense of belonging to an international Islamic 
brotherhood. The experience involved in the Afghan war in general 
and their contact with Al-Qaeda in particular boosted their desire for 
jiha>d against what they saw as the enemies of Islam and Islamic ummah, 
namely the “Crusaders,” the “Zionists,” as well as the “apostate” and 
secular Muslim rulers. Unlike other Southeast Asian Islamist groups, JI 
at this stage was, to borrow Gunaratna’s term, “an ideological 
hybrid”.48  
                                                 
46 Ahmad Rashid, Descent Into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in 
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Viking Penguin, 2008), p. 53; 
Esposito, Unholy War, p. 16;  
47 Ismail, “Al-Qaeda’s Southeast Asia”; ICG (International Crisis Group), “Al-Qaida in 
Southeast Asia.” 
48 Gunaratna, “Al-Qaeda’s Ideology,” p. 75. 
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Despite its roots were in Southeast Asia, JI’s ideological viewpoint 
became increasingly “Arabized” and developed a strong orientation 
toward the Middle East, most notably Saudi Arabia and Egypt. More 
specifically, JI began to incorporate the ideologies of the Egyptian Al-
Jama’ah al-Islamiyah, a breakaway faction of the Egyptian Muslim 
Brotherhood (Ikhwanul Muslimin) committed to armed struggle, as 
well as the Egyptian Islamic Jiha >d into its own thinking.49 After the 
death of JI charismatic leader Abdullah Sungkar and Ba’asyir took the 
lead of JI, however, JI members began to split. The younger member 
of JI such as Hambali, Imam Samudra, Ali Gufron, and Amrozi (the 
three latter were trio Bali bombers and again the Afghan war veterans 
who were shot by a firing squad) saw Ba’asyir as “too weak, too 
accommodating, and too easily influenced by others”.50 They also 
viewed the formation of MMI (the Indonesian Muja >hidi >n Council), an 
umbrella organization of Islamist groups whose primary objective was 
to campaign for the enforcement of Shari’at in Indonesia, by Ba’asyir 
and Irfan Awwas in 2000 as a betrayal of Sungkar’s original plan for JI 
to remain underground in its struggle to set up a global Islamic 
caliphate. JI’s radicals objected to working with Muslim political parties 
that advocated Islamic law through elections and parliament because 
they saw this as an accommodation with non-Islamic (Indonesian) 
state that would “contaminate the faithful” and was therefore 
forbidden. Ba’asyir himself after the founding of MMI in August 2000 
became so involved with MMI (later he split and founded a new 
group) and he turned over day-to-day running of JI to Abu Rusydan.  
Following the massive detainment of the terrorists by Southeast 
Asian governments, added by internal conflicts, today’s JI has become 
badly fractured organization in disarray. Nasir Abbas, former JI 
regional leader and “whistleblower” of JI networks (now in custody), 
says “JI is a ruin now…no management, no administration 
anymore.”51   
Radical Islamism’s Global and Local Elements  
The above explanation clearly shows the links between Southeast 
Asian Islamist terrorist groups and Afghanistan-based jihadists. 
                                                 
49 Hefner, “Muslim Democrats and Islamist Violence,” p. 292. 
50 ICG (International Crisis Group), “Al-Qaida in Southeast Asia.” 
51 As quoted in Thayer, “Leadership Dynamics in Terrorist Organizations,” p. 26. 
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However, linking Southeast Asia’s terrorism merely to Bin Laden and 
Al-Qaeda as “international terrorism experts” argued is 
overemphasized. Such Al-Qaeda-centric paradigm ignores the varieties 
of violent acts and complexities of the roots of terrorism. 
Furthermore, this view neglects various agencies, ideologies, schools of 
thought, and resources—both local and international—that have 
considerably contributed to the acts of terrorism in present-day 
Southeast Asia. As described above, in addition to the influences of 
Afghan muja>hidi>n (resistance fighters), modern-day Islamists are 
deeply rooted within “local dynamics,” socio-history, and politics of 
Southeast Asia.  
In a study on the Philippines’ separatism, Kit Collier, for instance, 
makes an interesting argument. Rather than discussing “global Islamic 
ideology,” Collier scrutinizes the local dynamics of the Philippines’ 
politics as the key root causes “Muslim separatism” in the southern 
region of the country. Collier also argues that the competition over 
local nationalist identity (the “Morohood”) posed by Muslim 
separatists and terrorist groups like the MNLF, MILF, and ASG with 
state identity is not driven by long-standing local politics, but rather 
more recent local political phenomena.52 In other words, the modern 
myth of Morohood and Islamic sentiments echoed by those Muslim 
separatists and terrorists are a form of present-day political 
mobilization or “social movement” for Muslim separatism by 
“exploiting” ethnic, cultural, and religious identity.53  
Mobilization either based on ethnicity, religion, or race, according 
to Olzak,54 is the capacity to tie together resources, including material 
resources and cultural/symbolic resources as well as organizations and 
solidarity, in an attempt to achieve some collective objectives. In the 
case of the Southern Philippines’s “Islamist” mobilization, 
furthermore, these “collective objectives” vary ranging from the 
creation of the region’s autonomy to the establishment of an Islamic 
state. In addition to a form of “ethnoreligious mobilization,” the 
                                                 
52 Collier, “Dynamics of Muslim Separatism.” 
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the Southern Philippines (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1998). 
54 Susan Olzak, “Ethnic, Racial, and Nationalist Movements,” in The Blackwell 
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Southern Philippines also can be defined as a sort of “nationalist 
movements” since the region’s political actors, namely the MNLF, 
MILF, and ASG, commonly articulate claims over the legitimate and 
legal right to rule a specific geographical area,55 albeit in the case of 
post-Janjalani ASG the idea of “nationalist sentiments” was quite 
blurred. In the pursuit of “sovereignty rights,” those radical 
organizations were involved in a series of violent conflicts with the 
region’s existing governments since the Marcos regime. It is significant 
to note that actors of nationalist movements in claiming sovereign 
rights do not always depend on race or “shared grievances” (of 
colonial or post-colonial past, for instance) as commonly occurred in 
world’s nationalist movements. Like in the case of the Southern 
Philippines, the nationalist movements can also be built based upon 
“ethnoreligious identity,” namely “Moorohood” and Islam. 
Accordingly, using Olzak’s theoretical framework, the Southern 
Philippines is a sort of “nationalistic Islamic movements.” Ethnicity as 
well as religion becomes transformed into a sort of nationalist 
movements when ethnic and religious actors make “specific historical 
claims and attempts to administer the group as a political 
community.”56 As depicted above, in an attempt to establish a separate 
region and to get “public support,” Southern Philippines’s separatist 
groups also claimed the historical distinctiveness and ethnic uniqueness 
of Bangsa Moro.57  
Seeing from a slightly different theoretical framework, the 
Southern Philippines’s separatist movement was also a form of the 
“invention of tradition” in the service of an “imagined community,” to 
borrow the famous term of the political scientist, Benedict Anderson. 
It is significant to notice that the foundation of the MNLF—the oldest 
separatist group—was only in 1971. This year coincided with the 
national elections and the southern Philippines had become an arena 
of elite competition, notably the two national political parties: Liberal 
and Nacionalista, as the centralizing regime of Ferdinand Marcos 
sought to tighten its grip on a rapidly expanding constituency in the 
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South. Marcos, elected president under the banner of Naciolista in 
1965, competed with a long-standing Liberal Party activist, Salipada 
Pendatun. The southern electorates became a major rivalry for 
Christian elites because Muslims are not dominant populace in the 
southern Philippines any more since Christian communities migrated 
to the region, particularly since 1946. Between 1918 and 1970, the 
Christian influx reduced Muslims from 60% to 28% of the population 
of the Cotabato region; from 91% to 61% of the Lanao region; and 
from 62% to just 13% in the Zamboanga region.58  
Driven by local socio-political conditions that un-favored Muslim 
communities, during that time, the datus, local elite Muslim aristocrats 
who held religious authority on the basis of ancestral ties to the 
Prophet Muhammad, which were previously excluded from power in 
the elections of 1967-71, embraced the symbols of a new form of 
politics built on the basis of ethnicity (Bangsa Moro) and religion (Islam) 
championed by young radicals like Nur Misuari and Hashim Salamat. 
Against this local socio-political backdrop, added by political 
discrimination and coercion of Marcos regime, the establishment of 
the above separatist groups can be understood. Thus, the “Morohood 
identity” posed by those Muslim ‘separatists’ is not “naturally 
invented,” but rather “socially constructed” within the frameworks of 
local socio-political settings. Such ethnic and religious identity has 
served not only as a vehicle of popular Muslim emancipation but also a 
means of obscuring the mechanisms of class and ethnic domination.59  
The data and explanation presented above suggest that Southern 
Philippines’s ethnoreligious separatism and conflict was deeply rooted 
in, and strongly linked to, the region’s instrumental and symbolic 
resources. As a result, in analyzing the region’s violent conflicts and 
separatist movements one needs to carefully examine both 
“instrumental and symbolic theory,” not simply dub it the Al-Qaeda’s 
networks of “global terrorism.” While instrumental theory argues that 
the nationalism, ethnoreligious separatism, and ethno-religious conflict, 
were artificial modern phenomena, and “invented” by the elite, the 
                                                 
58 Compare the Southern Philippines’s transmigration to that of Indonesia that also 
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symbolic theory brings historical explanations based upon ethnic 
symbols, shared historical and cultural values and myths, including 
religious values and symbols. The instrumentalist theory, moreover, 
conceives the ethnic identity as created and constructed by the ethnic 
elite.60 Additionally, the instrumental theory points out that the 
modernization and economic factors were the fundamental sources of 
the ethnic conflict. The symbolic theory, by contrast, does not link the 
recent phenomena of ethnoreligious conflict (as well as separatism and 
terrorism) to the modern era since there is continuity between the past 
and the present time. For the symbolists, symbols, myths, and cultural 
values are the major constructors of ethnicity, thereby serve as a 
“fertile ground” for the conflict and violence.61 Looking at more 
closely to the Southern Philippines’s ethnoreligious political 
movements, one can find that the region’s separatist and terrorist 
groups built their movements based on the ethnic grievances of 
instrumentalist and symbolic resources.   
Like the Southern Philippines’s separatism and terrorism, 
Indonesia’s Islamist terrorism is also deeply rooted in the country’s 
sociopolitical contexts and cultural dynamics. Most current Indonesian 
jihadists affiliated to JI, for instance, are DI veterans or at least have 
some links with DI members, families, and associates.62 The Dutch 
anthropologist and Indonesianist Martin van Bruinessen also takes the 
same line stating that the origins of post-Suharto Indonesia’s Muslim 
radical groups are two relatively ‘indigenous’ Muslim political 
movements—the DI and Masyumi—added by some contemporary 
transnational Islamic networks. Giving the emphasis on the local 
politics and history of Indonesia as the nature of recent Muslim 
political movement, van Bruinessen argues that transnational networks, 
along which people, ideas, and money move, have become extremely 
important but “they are not the sole determining factor”.63 The 
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dynamics of local politics in the Philippines also serve as the backbone 
for the rise of Muslim separatist movements. Islamist and separatist 
movements waged by Filipino Moros had been driven by coercion and 
discriminatory acts against them committed by the dictator Ferdinand 
Marcos when he had been in power since 1965.64  
Indeed, regarding the dynamics and history of Indonesian politics, 
religious-driven violence is not a new phenomenon. The historian 
M.C. Ricklefs in his Polarizing Javanese Society traces back the “religious-
based violence” to the lengthy conflict between “Kaum Putihan” (lit. the 
“white group” referring to santri, strict Muslims) and “Kaum Abangan” 
(lit. the “red people” meaning simply non-santri. It could be Javanese 
abangan Muslims or non-Muslims) since the mid-nineteenth century. 
Although prolonged conflicts between these two groups took place 
since the 19th century, the deep social chasm between the putihan and 
the abangan, Ricklefs has argued, occurred in the 1950s when such 
polarization had become ‘primordial’ and deeply politicized since 
national, regional, and local religious and political leaders struggled and 
competed for getting supporters of their political parties.65 
Moreover, although Al-Qaeda influence on Southeast Asian 
Muslim terrorists was apparent,66 it does not mean that Al-Qaeda and 
Bin Laden were the only source and agent of terror. As Barton 
correctly highlights, the origins of terrorist groups such as JI in 
particular and contemporary radical Islamism in general can be traced 
back to the foundation of Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII—
the Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication) in 1967, besides Darul 
Islam and Komando Jihad movements. Founded by prominent 
Muslim modernist and revivalist Muhammad Natsir (1908-1993), 
during the early years of the Suharto regime, DDII was the main 
conduit for Saudi-Wahabi ideas. Barton said that the initial objective of 
the founding of DDII was “to act as a vehicle for advancing the 
interests of conservative Islamist politics and blocking Christian 
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expansion”.67 Soon after its establishment, the DDII forged close ties 
with the Saudi-sponsored Rabitah al-‘Alam al-Islami (Islamic World 
League, established in 1962), of which Natsir became one of the Vice-
Chairmen. Already in the 1970s, when Saudi Arabia benefited from the 
rise in the price of oil, the DDII—with Saudi funding—had begun to 
spread Wahabi-Salafi teachings by building religious institutions, 
mosques, and schools, as well as translating and publishing Saudi-Salafi 
tracts, most of which were notable for their anti-Christian and anti-
Jewish diatribes.68 Coincidentally, since the 1970s, Saudi also supported 
the Deobandi madrasas which have been the training ground for Al-
Qaeda, Taliban, and other militant groups in Pakistan, Kashmir, and 
Afghanistan.69  
With the jiha>di > mobilization against the Soviets in Afghanistan, 
and with the growing irritation in many Arab capitals with U.S. policies 
in the Middle East, this propaganda took on an even more militantly 
jihadist tone.70 With the end of the Afghanistan campaign and the 
outbreak of violence in Bosnia, Kashmir, Chechnya, and other Muslim 
territories, the literature escalated its critique into a full-blown attack 
on alleged “Jewish-Christian” conspiracies against Islam. Its media 
organ, Media Dakwah, has become the main instrument of spreading 
Wahhabism, Salafism, propaganda anti-non Wahabi culture and 
teachings including the teachings of Islamist thinkers like Qutb, al-
Banna, and Maududi.71 Saudi Arabia, through DDII, also built a 
college named the Institute for Islamic and Arabic Studies (known as 
LIPIA) in Jakarta under the supervision of Riyadh-based Imam 
Muhammad Ibn Saud Islamic University. Since early in the 1980s, the 
LIPIA has been the vehicle of the propaganda of Wahhabism. Most 
present-day Indonesian Islamist radical leaders such as Ja’far Umar 
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Thalib72 (founder of Laskar Jihad) and Muhammad Habib Riziq (the 
founder of the Islamic Defender Front) are among the alumni of this 
institution.73 By the 1980s, thus, Islamist ideas from the Middle East 
and the Indian sub-continental had been translated and were in 
circulation in Indonesia and elsewhere in Southeast Asia. These 
mingled and fused with the individual experiential and ideational 
trajectories of Sungkar and Ba’asyir. Broadly speaking, the injections of 
al-Banna and Maududi to set up a “vanguard” community to serve as 
the “dynamic nucleus for true Islamic reformation within the broader 
society”74 were long accepted by the Indonesian clerics and radical 
Islamists.75   
It is also noteworthy to notice that the DDII is a re-embodiment 
of Masjumi, an Islamist political party during the Sukarno era that 
supported the implementation of Islamic Law within Indonesian 
Constitution and the establishment of an Islamic state in the country. 
Indeed, the founder of DDII Muhammad Natsir was one of the 
eminent leaders of Masjumi. Due to some political leaders of Masjumi 
were involved in a rebel movement held by the Revolutionary 
Government of the Republics of Indonesia (known as PRRI) against 
the government, Sukarno banned Masjumi in 1960. It is common 
among Indonesian scholars that while Sukarno was an admirer of 
Mustafa Kamal at-Ataturk (1881-1938), Muhammad Natsir was 
“devotee” of Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949). Tracing back to DDII and 
Masjumi as one of the roots of the emergence of Islamist radicalism in 
Indonesia is central in part because most Indonesian radical jihadists 
had been linked to these organizations. JI figures like Abdullah 
Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba’asyir were ex-activists of those groups.  
Other Indonesia-based reformist institutions that also contributed 
to and transformed the shape of the ideology of modern radical 
Islamists and activists are Al-Irsyad al-Islamiyah (henceforth, Al-
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Irsyad) and Persatuan Islam (Persis—the Islamic Union). Al-Irsyad was 
founded by Indonesian clerics of Arab descents (around 1937) whose 
main objective was to disseminate strict Islamic teachings and 
doctrines.76 Founded in 1923, Persis was also famous for its 
conservatism in rejecting all forms of innovations and superstitions in 
Muslim religious beliefs and practices just like Wahabi in Saudi Arabia 
and elsewhere. Headquartered in West Java’s Bandung (the home-base 
of DI), Persis has been well-know for its criticism against secularism, 
pluralism, and liberalism.77 Thus the rise of JI and other radicalized 
Islamic groups in modern Indonesia was already implicit in the 
dynamics of these local political settings and histories.  
Conclusion  
The description I sketched above confirms what Edward Said calls 
“travelling idea.” Said develops a “travelling theory,” saying that the 
ideas and theories—like people and schools of criticism—travel “from 
person to person, from situation to situation, and from one period to 
one another”.78 Like other ideas and theories, the notions of radical 
Islamism as the roots of modern “Islamist terrorism” also travel to 
Southeast Asia’s regions, not only from the Middle East, Afghanistan, 
India, or Pakistan (“international travel”) but also from local Southeast 
Asia itself (“domestic travel”). Such ideas had been brought to 
Southeast Asia by various agents and actors—both organizations and 
individuals—who functioned as carriers, transmitters, and transformers 
of knowledge and a vehicle of changing notions of religious violence 
and terrorism. JI, ASG, and MILF are only part of those agents that 
transfer and transform ideas of radical Islamism. Equally important, 
Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda also served as only one of the resources of 
Islamic radicalism, not the only ingredient of Islamist terrorism as the 
“international terrorism experts” assert.  
Travelling idea of Islamic radicalism, furthermore, has pursued 
what Said79 called the “phases of acceptance, modification, and a new 
interpretation” due to different social-political settings. Within the 
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context of Indonesian history, as I depicted above, the idea of Islamic 
radicalism has also undergone a process of modification and 
interpretation of meanings. While Darul Islam’s radicalism aimed at the 
opposition to the Sukarno’s ‘Old Order’ regime and the establishment 
of an Islamic state separated from the newly Indonesian country, 
Komando Jihad’s religious violence emerged on the scene of 
Indonesian history and politics was merely as a manifestation of 
resistance against Suharto-led dictatorial New Order. Contemporary 
Islamist terrorists, moreover, appeared as the “confrontation” against 
what they vaguely called the “enemies of Islam.” The definition of the 
“enemies of Islam” definitely differs from one group to another 
depending on cultural, political, and economic interests of each 
Islamist group. In the case of Philippines, furthermore, 
implementation of the idea of “Islamic radicalism” also differs from 
group to group. MNLF, for instance, took more “nationalistic” (read, 
Morohood) and “less-Islamic,” while MILF was concerned with the 
idea of “Islamic identity” of Bangsa Moro. For MNLF, the most 
important thing is the creation of autonomous Southern Philippines 
(read, political interests), whereas MILF desired to “marry” “Islam-
ness” and Morohood in an Islamic caliphate in the region (read, 
“symbolic/cultural interests”). ASG, by contrast, is more complicated. 
Although the initial goal of ASG was to create a “Southeast Asian 
Islamic caliphate,” after the death of its founder, ASG’s terrorism and 
sporadic violence were turned and grounded merely on the basis of the 
economic interests.  
The above depiction suggests that the process of knowledge 
production and cultural reproduction of Islamic radicalism taking place 
in different time, space, and social settings has different “meanings,” 
interpretation, and implementation. These Islamist groups, however, 
have shared the same “values,” i.e. the use of “religiously inspired 
violence,” a sort of “sacred bitterness,” to achieve their symbolic, 
political, and economic interests.[] 
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